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³In the Aristotelian tradition to call something good is to make a factual statement. To ask, for 
H[DPSOH¶ZKDWLVDJRRGFDSWDLQ¶"¶LVQRWWRFRPHXSZLWKDOLVWRIattributes that good captains share 
>«@ EXW WR SRLQW RXW WKH WKLQJV WKDW WKRVH ZKR DUH UHFRJQL]HG DV JRRG FDSWDLQV GR´ 7VRXNDV 	
Cummings, 1997, p. 670) 
 
For Aristotle ³we cannot be prudent [i.e. wise] without being good and we cannot be fully good 
without being prudent, taking the particulars of the situation into account´(LNHODQGS, [our 
addition]).   
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Introduction 
 
In Social Science (Organization Studies, Economics, Management Science, Strategy, 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO 5HODWLRQV 3ROLWLFDO 6FLHQFH« WKH TXHVW IRU DGGUHVVLQJ WKH TXHVWLRQ ³ZKDW is a good 
SUDFWLWLRQHU"´KDVEHHQDURXQGIRUFHQWXULHV, with the underlying assumptions that good practitioners 
should lead organizations to higher levels RISHUIRUPDQFH+HQFHWRDVN³ZKDWLVDJRRG³FDSWDLQ´"´LV
not a new question, we should add! (e.g. Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 670; Söderlund, 2004, p. 
190).  
 
This interrogation leads to consider problems such as the relations between dichotomies Theory 
and Practice, rigor and relevance of research, ways of knowing and knowledge forms. On the one 
hand we face the ³(QOLJKWHQPHQW´assumptions underlying modern positivist Social science, grounded 
in ³unity-of-science dream of transforming and reducing all kinds of knowledge to one basic form and 
level´ DQG FDXVH-effects relationships (Eikeland, 2012, p. 20), and on the other, the postmodern 
interpretivist proposal, and its ³tendency to make all kinds of knowing equivalent´(LNHODQGS
20). In the project management space, this aims at addressing one of the fundamental problems in the 
field: projects still do not deliver their expected benefits and promises and therefore the socio-
economical good (Hodgson & Cicmil, 2007; Bredillet, 2010, Lalonde et al., 2012). The Cartesian 
tradition supporting projects research and practice for the last 60 years (Bredillet, 2010, p. 4) has led 
to the lack of relevance to practice of the current conceptual base of project management, despite the 
sum of research, development of standards, best & good practices and the related development of 
project management bodies of knowledge (Packendorff, 1995, p. 319-323; Cicmil & Hodgson, 2006, p. 
2±6, Hodgson & Cicmil, 2007, p. 436±7; Winter et al., 2006, p. 638). Referring to both Hodgson (2002) 
and Giddens (1993), we FRXOGVD\WKDW³WKRVHZKRH[SHFWD³VRFLDO-VFLHQWLILF1HZWRQ´WRUHYROXWLRQL]H
WKLV \RXQJ ILHOG ³DUH QRW RQO\ ZDLWLQJ IRU D WUDLQ WKDW ZLOO QRW DUULYH EXW DUH Ln the wrong station 
DOWRJHWKHU´ (Hodgson, 2002, p. 809; Giddens, 1993, p. 18). While, in the postmodern stream mainly 
rooted in WKH³SUDFWLFHWXUQ´HJHällgren & Lindahl, 2012), the shift from methodological individualism 
to social viscosity and the advocated pluralism lead to reinforce WKH³functional stupidity´$OYHVVRQ	
Spicer, 2012, p. 1194) this postmodern stream aims at overcoming.  
 
We VXJJHVW KHUH WKDW DGGUHVVLQJ WKH TXHVWLRQ ³ZKDW LV D JRRG 30"´ UHTXLUHV D SKLORVRSK\ RI
practice perspective to FRPSOHPHQWWKH³XVXDO´SKLORVRphy of science perspective. The questioning of 
the modern Cartesian tradition mirrors a similar one made within Social science (Say, 1964; Koontz, 
1961, 1980; Menger, 1985; Warry, 1992; Rothbard, 1997a; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997; Flyvbjerg, 
2001; Boisot & MF.HOYH\FDOOLQJIRUQHZWKLQNLQJ ,QRUGHUWRJHWRXWVLGHWKHUDWLRQDOLVW µER[¶
Toulmin (1990, p. 11), along with Tsoukas & Cummings (1997, p. 655), suggests a possible path, 
summarizing the thoughts of many authors:  
 
³,W FDQ FOLQJ WR WKH GLVFUHGLWHG UHVHDUFK SURJUDP RI WKH SXUHO\ WKHRUHWLFDO LH ³PRGHUQ´
philosophy, which will end up by driving it out of business: it can look for new and less exclusively 
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WKHRUHWLFDOZD\VRIZRUNLQJDQGGHYHORSWKHPHWKRGVQHHGHGIRUDPRUHSUDFWLFDO³SRVW-moGHUQ´
agenda; or it can return to its pre-WKFHQWXU\WUDGLWLRQVDQGWU\WRUHFRYHUWKHORVW³SUH-PRGHUQ´
topics that were side-WUDFNHGE\'HVFDUWHVEXWFDQEHXVHIXOO\WDNHQXSIRUWKHIXWXUH´ (Toulmin, 
1990, p. 11). 
 
Thus, paradoxically and interestingly, in their quest for the so-called post-modernism, many 
DXWKRUVEXLOGRQ³pre-modern´SKLORVRSKLHVVXFKDVWKH$ULVWRWHOLDQRQHHJ0DF,QW\UH
Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Blomquist et al., 2010; Lalonde et al., 2012). It is 
perhaps because the post-modern stream emphasizes a dialogic1 process restricted to reliance on 
voice and textual representation, it limits the meaning of communicative praxis, and weaking the 
practice because it turns away attention from more fundamental issues associated with problem-
definition and knowledge-for-use in action (Tedlock, 1983, p. 332±4; Schrag, 1986, p. 30, 46±7; 
Warry, 1992, p. 157). (LNHODQG VXJJHVWV WKDW WKH $ULVWRWHOLDQ ³gnoseology2 allows for reconsidering 
and reintegrating ways of knowing: traditional, practical, tacit, emotional, experiential, intuitive, etc., 
marginalised and considered insufficient by modernist [and post-modernist] thinking´(LNHODQG
p. 20²21).  
 
By contrast with the modernist one-dimensional thinking and relativist and pluralistic post-
modernism, we suggest, in a turn to an Aristotelian pre-modern lens, to re-conceptualise ³UH´LQYROYLQJ
KHUHD³UH´-turn to pre-modern thinking) the ³do´DQGWRVKLIWWKHSHUVSHFWLYHIURPZKDWDJRRG30 is 
(philosophy of science lens) to what a good PM does (philosophy of practice lens) (Aristotle, 1926a). 
As Tsoukas & Cummings put it:  
 
³In the Aristotelian tradition to call something good is to make a factual statement. To ask, for 
H[DPSOH ¶ZKDW LVDJRRGFDSWDLQ¶"¶ LVQRW WRFRPHXSZLWKD OLVWRIDWWULEXWHV WKDWJRRGFDSWDLQV
share (as modem contingency theorists would have it), but to point out the things that those who 
are recognized as good captains do.´7VRXNDV	&XPPLQJVS 
 
Thus, this conversation offers a dialogue and deliberation about a central question: What does a 
good project manager do? The conversation is organized around a critic of the underlying 
assumptions supporting the modern, post-modern and pre-modern relations to ways of knowing, forms 
RINQRZOHGJHDQG³SUDFWLFH´.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                
1  ͞From  a  dialogic  perspective  the  difference  between  voices  in  dialogue  is  constitutive  of  meaning  in  such  a  way  
ƚŚĂƚŝƚŵĂŬĞƐŶŽƐĞŶƐĞƚŽŝŵĂŐŝŶĞ͚ŽǀĞƌĐŽŵŝŶŐ͛ƚŚŝƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ͘ǇĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ͕ĚƵĞƚŽƚŚĞŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ
meaning  is  ultimately  grounded  on  identity  rather  than  upon  difference,  the  dialectic  perspective  applied  by  
sǇŐŽƚƐŬǇŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐĂƐ͚ĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ͛ƚŚĂƚŶĞĞĚƚŽďĞŽǀĞƌĐŽŵĞŽƌƚƌĂŶƐĐĞŶĚĞĚ͟.  (Wegerif,  2008,  p.  
347)  
2  For  Eikeland  (2007,  p.  347)  gnoseology,  by  contrast  to  epistemology,  involves  broader  notion  of  knowledge.  
Epistêmê  is  just  one  form  of  gnôsis.  
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A focus on the context of temporary organizing 
 
We choose to consider here the project manager role as an H[DPSOHRI³PDQDJHU´DQGWKHUHIRUH
shift the organizational context and focus from classical organizations to temporary-based 
organization. While as an allied purpose of this paper, we suggest reversing the perspective between 
temporary and permanent organization, i.e. we posit that any organization is to some extent 
temporary, as transforming itself or part of itself in permanence: there is nothing permanent except 
change as stated by Heraclitus. Thus permanent organizing is an extreme case of organizing, rather 
than an opposing form of temporary organizing. We can therefore talk about different degrees of 
temporariness of organizational forms (Bakker, 2010, p. 468) and organizing phenomena. In our 
investigation we then consider the definition and context of temporary organizations described in the 
literature (e.g. Lundin & Söderholm, 1995, Packendorff, 19953, Bakker, 2010) as being pertinent: 
³WHPSRUDU\RUJDQL]DWLRQDOIRUPVVKRXOGEHUHJDUGHG³DVLQH[RUDEO\LQWHUZRYHQZLWKDQRUJDQL]DWLRQDO
and social conWH[WZKLFKSURYLGHVNH\UHVRXUFHVRIH[SHUWLVHUHSXWDWLRQDQGOHJLWLPL]DWLRQ´*UDEKHU
2004a, p. 1492)´ (Bakker, 2010, p. 468). However, in contrast with Bakker, we argue that the 
relationships with the broader organizational and social context are both dialectic AND dialogic 
(Wegerif, 2008, p. 347) rather than being strictly dialectic (Bakker, 2010, p. 481), - demonstrating 
some mechanisms of coordination constitutive of meaning rather than only differences to be 
overcome. As matter of consequence, we consider as a normal state of affairs, uncertainty (Stark, 
2000, p. 3), hidden knowledge (Gomez & Jones, 2000, p. 697) and information with regards to 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQ DQGD SOXUDOLVWLF RUJDQL]DWLRQDO FRQWH[W LH ³«FKDUDFWHUL]HG E\PXOWLSOH REMHFWLYHV
diffuse power and knowledge-based work processes´'HQLVHWDOS 
 
Modern ³SUDFWLFH´ 
 
Practices and models, standards 
 
The following presentation enables us to clarify how modern Social science, represented below by 
neoclassical economics and organization theory(ies), and their key assumptions are impacting of 
management practices and models (i.e. standards).  
 
Neoclassical economics 
 
Neoclassical economics, the dominant and most widely used school in economics, relate to supply 
and demand to an individual's rationality (rational choice theory), on determination of prices and 
                                                                                                                                
3  Packendorff  (1995,  p.  327),  summarizing  previous  works  since  Miles  (1964),  defines  a  temporary  organization  
as  follows:  1)  ͞is  an  organized  (collective)  course  of  action  aimed  at  evoking  a  non-­‐routine  process  and/or  
completing  a  non-­‐routine  product;  [Proposition  1];  2)  has  a  predetermined  point  in  time  or  time-­‐related  
conditional  state  when  the  organization  and/or  its  mission  is  collectively  expected  to  cease  to  exist;  [Proposition  
2];  3)  has  some  kind  of  performance  evaluation  criteria;  [Proposition  3];  4)  is  so  complex  in  terms  of  roles  and  
number  of  roles  that  it  requires  conscious  organizing  efforts  (i.e.  not  spontaneous  self-­‐organizing).͟΀WƌŽƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ
4]    
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outputs, and RQH¶Vability to maximize utility and value (income constrained individuals) or profit (costs 
constrained firms) employing DYDLODEOH LQIRUPDWLRQDQG IDFWRUVRISURGXFWLRQ ³It based on the belief 
that competition leads to an efficient allocation of resources, and regulates economic activity that 
establishes equilibrium between demand and supply through the operation of market forces´ 
(source: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/neo-classical-economics.html#ixzz2PuxVuxbt, 
accessed 9 April 2013).  
 
The neoclassical economics theories are guided by the following assumptions (Gomez, 2006, p. 
219): 
 
-­‐ Individual actors have rational preferences and are intelligent and capable of interpreting the 
signals they receive; 
-­‐ They are autonomous, define the own private utility or profits ± individuals maximize utility and 
firms maximize profits ± specially the one leading them to be concerned by such or such 
information; 
-­‐ Any exchange between actors, acting independently, is located par reciprocal, full and 
relevant information. 
 
We note that management practices and models expected benefits are focusing on aspects such 
as increasing productivity, access to new markets, facilitate free and fair global trade. All aspects are 
rooted in rationality, utility and profit, and transparent information. The definition of standard4 ³«
aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order«´ LV related to market equilibrium. 
Neoclassical theories such as the resource-EDVHG YLHZ ³increasing productivity´« DQG WKHUHIRUH
providing a competitive advantage with regards to costs), the market-EDVHG YLHZ ³need in the 
market´DQGWKHHQFRPSDVVLQJVWDNeholder-EDVHGYLHZ³multi-stakeholder process´LQWHJUDWLQJERWK
the resource-based view as well as the market-based view and adding a socio-political level, are 
heavily called upon.  
 
                                                                                                                                
4  StandardizĂƚŝŽŶŝƐĂŶ͞activity  of  establishing,  with  regard  to  actual  or  potential  problems,  provisions  for  
common  and  repeated  use,  aimed  at  the  achievement  of  the  optimum  degree  of  order  in  a  given  context.͟
(Hatto,  2010,  p.  9)  
For  the  International  Organization  for  Standardization  (ISO)  a  standard,  developed  by  a  panel  of  experts,  is  
defined  as  :  ͞Document,  established  by  consensus  and  approved  by  a  recognized  body,  that  provides,  for  
common  and  repeated  use,  rules,  guidelines  or  characteristics  for  activities  or  their  results,  aimed  at  the  
achievement  of  the  optimum  degree  of  order  in  a  given  context.    
Note  1  to  entry:  Standards  should  be  based  on  the  consolidated  results  of  science,  technology  and  experience,  
and  aimed  at  the  promotion  of  optimum  community  benefits.͟  
(Source:  ISO/IEC  Guide  2:2004,  definition  3.2;  and  ISO/IEC  Directives,  Part  2,  2011,  p.  8;  also  in  Hatto,  2010,  p.  
5).    
TŚĞĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐŽĨƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐŝƐƚŽ͞ensure  that  products  and  services  are  safe,  reliable  and  of  good  
quality.  For  business,  they  are  strategic  tools  that  reduce  costs  by  minimizing  waste  and  errors  and  increasing  
productivity.  They  help  companies  to  access  new  markets,  level  the  playing  field  for  developing  countries  and  
facilitate  free  and  fair  global  trade.͟  
(Source:  http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards.htm:  accessed  9  March  2013).  
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Organization Theory(ies) 
 
Besides these abovementioned roots in neoclassical economics, and linked to it, three key issues 
are to be underscored in relation to organizational theory(ies).  
 
Consensus 
 
First, management practices and models are established by consensus and used to facilitate 
interoperability, coordination and communication amongst adopters and stakeholders, relying on 
equilibrium-based theory (Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 1516) and this linear world of equilibrium 
enables predictability (Stacey, 2010, p. 20). This approach focuses on stable entities and structure and 
LQGLYLGXDOV DQG RUJDQL]DWLRQV IXQFWLRQ QRW ³act´ RQ WKH EDVLV RI DQ H[FKDQJH UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK WKH
environment. Under this view, mutual coordination (Parsons & Shills, 1951) between two parties 
occurs via a normative orientation; ie.,  common norms and values that exist prior to the interaction, 
DQG ³can only take place against a common background of meaning that is abstracted from the 
particularity of the situation (Parsons, 1951)´ +HUQHV	Bakken, 2003, p. 1516). As Mettler puts it 
³Conflicts of interest can be avoided by using a measurement model developed externally to the 
organisation´ (Mettler, 2011, p. 82). This normative orientation forms the double contingency that is 
imposed on them (Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 1517).  
 
Transparent and available information 
 
Second, management practices and models aim at enabling actions on the basis of full and 
available, relevant and transparent information. )URP ³RUJDQL]DWLRQ´ FRPLQJ IURP WKH HTXLOLErium-
EDVHGYLHZZHDUHPRYLQJWR³RUJDQL]LQJ´:HLFN7KLVLVVXSSRUWHGE\SURFHVV-based 
WKHRULHVZKHUH³The focus on actions rather than structure puts the subject in the center and opens up 
subjective interpretations of organizational reality´ +HUQHV 	 %DNNHQ  S  6XEMHFWV DUH
thought to be autonomous and making rational choices, setting goals and prescriptive decisions with 
regards to the future on the basis of calculations using transparent information, enabling some kind of 
cerWDLQW\RUUDWLRQDOULVNDVVHVVPHQW³Control is about monitoring outcomes against the plan, the gaps 
being closed by appropriate actions´ (Stacey, 2010, p. 11). Management practices and models, by 
purposes of use, are designed supporting rational assessment on the basis of transparent information, 
decision-making and improvement actions.  
 
Certainty, stability 
 
Third, because of the assumptions made about consensus and transparency of information, 
individuals are assumed able to act on the basis of stable, certain structures enabling complexity 
reduction and calculation of the likely outcomes of their actions. This assumption about certainty and 
order is embodied i.e. in standards (see definition in note 4). As Brunsson et al. state, sWDQGDUGV³are 
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VDLGWRPDNHWKHFRPSOH[ZRUOGVLPSOHUDQGWRSURYLGHRSWLPDORU³JRRG´VROXWLRQVSROLFLHVSURGXFWV
and so on´%UXQVVRQHWDOS 
 
Criticisms  
 
Say (1964, p. xix-xx) mocks the naiveté of the public toward statistics:  
 
³Sometimes, moreover, a display of figures and calculations imposes upon them; as if numerical 
calculations alone could prove anything, and as if any rule could be laid down, from which an 
inference could be drawn without the aid of sound reasoning´ 
 
He argues that the mathematical method, with its seeming exactitude, can only seriously distort 
the analysis of qualitative human action by stretching and oversimplifying the legitimate insights of 
economic principles (Rothbard, 1997a, p. 42 ± 43). This is acknowledged by Andriani & McKelvey 
(2007) who provide an insightful critique of Greene's standard textbook (2002) showing how, despite 
some efforts to minimize the effect of varying variances, this authors ignores "interdependent, 
interacting, connectionist, interconnecting, coevolutionary, mutual causal data points, events or 
agents" (Andriani & McKelvey, 2007, p. 1223).  
 
Brunsson et al. (2000, pp. 169² VXPPDUL]H WKH ³SURV´ YV ³FRQV´ VWDQGDUGV DQG
VWDQGDUGL]DWLRQ GHEDWH )RU WKH ³SURV´ VWDQGDUGV DUH HIIHFWLYH ZD\ RI WUDQVPLWWLQJ LQIRUPDWLRQ
(content, compliance or accreditation/certification). They have coordinating function (products, agents) 
and reduce the amount of information needed. They bring some degree of simplification reducing the 
number of possibilities to be considered. They also facilitate information and communication, and 
coordination and bring about higher degree of order.7KH\RIIHU³JRRG´RU³EHVW´SUDFWLFHVSroviding 
good or best solutions, and they support innovation and variation as organizations do not need to 
invest time and efforts on areas covered by their scope. Lastly they facilitate similarity; for instance, 
they aid managers to interface between systems, and thus making things easier for industries and 
consumers +RZHYHU WKH ³FRQV´KDYHVRPHDUJXPHQWVDJDLQVW VWDQGDUGVDQGVWDQGDUGL]DWLRQ7KH\
are seen are reducing freedom and hamper intervention from people from the outside willing to impose 
VRPHNLQGRIXQLIRUPLW\WRSURGXFWVVHUYLFHVPDUNHWV«7KH\OHDGWRUHVWUDLQGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQDQGWKXV
innovation and creativity, by making people or organizations more alike. In a similar way, they are 
seen going too far in stabilizing the world. The motivation, or hidden agenda, of standard producers, 
H[SHUWV RUJDQL]DWLRQV VWDWHV« LV TXHVWLRQHG DQG LW LV QRW VHHQ DV QHFHVVDULO\ SURPRWLQJ WKH
community benefits. But the opposite is true as well, and some think that standardization should 
further, as standards are too important to the world and for the protection of the community. In short 
the criticism can be summarized as more market vs. more regulations.  
 
Despite this debate between the ³SURV´ DQG ³FRQV´ VWDQGDUGV DQG VWDQGDUGL]DWLRQ Whe answers 
brought to the performance problems organizations of all kind are facing are pretty much the same , 
Page 8 - 40 
WKDWLVPRUH³VWDQGDUG´VWDQGDUGL]DWLRQLVH[SHFWHGWROHDGWRKLJKHUSHUIRUPDQFHAgents, in a broad 
sense, delude themselves falling into the Great Illusion of control through this equilibrium and process-
based view of management practices and PRGHOVEDVHGRQWKH³mechanistic and rationalistic theories 
that have historically dominated organizatioQDQGPDQDJHPHQWVWXGLHV´(Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, 
p. 655); this is notwithstanding the fact that, as demonstrated for instance by March & Sutton (1997), 
quantitative management studies, in which performance is modelled as a dependent variable, fail to 
deliver their promise of managerial advice. Along with other authors (Daft & Buenger, 1990; Lampel & 
Shapira, 1995) the general conclusion drawn by Kieser & Nicolai (2005) LVWKDW³the search for stable 
success factors is as futile as the search for the phiORVRSKHU¶VVWRQH´SDQGWKDW³the potential of 
performance research to create actionable knowledge is limited´S,QDVLPLODUYHLQ2¶1HLOOLQ
consideration to the Cynefin framework (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003) raises a key SRLQW ³the Cynefin 
framework relaxes three core assumptions that conventionally apply to policy-making models - 
namely: order, rational choice and intentional capability´2¶1HLOOS ,QVKRUWZHQHHGWR
PRYH IURP ³EHVW´ DQG ³JRRG´ SUDFWLFHV VXLWDEOH IRU D VLPSOH or complicated environment to more 
emergent and novel practices relevant for or complex or chaotic world. Thus, management 
approaches are increasingly subject to doubts and mistrusts in their ability to provide relevant 
guidelines to cope with the perceived increased uncertainty and complexity of our World (Hock, 1995). 
Facing increasing uncertainty and complexity and related change and diversity (Jackson, 2003, p. xiii), 
managers are looking for way of finding certainty through information supporting choice and decision-
making, sustained by ex-ante rationalization, which is usually some kind of cause-effect relationships 
OHDGLQJ WR EHVW SRVVLEOH VROXWLRQ VWDELOLW\ SUHGLFWDELOLW\ DQG FRQWURO RI WKH ³IXWXUH´ *RPH] 
Stacey, 2010). In order to do so, WKH\WXUQWKHPVHOYHVLQ-DFNVRQ¶VZRUGV-DFNVRQS[LYWR
WKH SOHWKRUD RI ³prescriptive panaceas´ DQG ³management fads´ H[SHFWHG WR EULQJ VLPSOH VROXWLRQV
through best or good practices, normative approaches and standards (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). 
However, these solutions do not work. They are not holistic enough, and addressing only one part of a 
system (e.g. an organization) instead of the whole, they miss the interactions and interdependencies 
ZLWKRWKHUSDUWVDQGWKXVOHDGWR³suboptimization´-DFNVRQS[LY)XUWKHUDVGHPRQVWUDWHG
E\6WDFH\SWKHUHLVD³lack of evidence base for prescriptions of the dominant discourse´
Classical cause-effects investigations and researches are not very helpful to this regards, and once 
again, we can put forward trivial explanations:  
 
-­‐ The difficulty of providing traditional scientific evidence (generalizable knowledge about causal 
relationships) in an uncertain and complex world (Stacey, 2010, p. 17); 
-­‐ The above, because of the problem RIGHPRQVWUDWLQJFDXVDO UHODWLRQVKLS ³LI[« WKHQ\´ QRW
statistical correlations or associations), with regards to the non-repetitiveness of events in non-
linear uncertain and complex set of relationships between variables or factors, by contrast with 
linear relationships, where causalities are certain, leading to define and produce optimal state 
(efficiency), rational decision-making (autonomous choice and rational selected goals based 
on calculation), and formative (revealing and realizing a mature form already given) (Stacey, 
2010, p. 48).  
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Hence, with the dominant evidence-based management (Rousseau, 2006) fad and despite its 
well-known onto-HSLVWHPRORJLFDOIDXOWOLQH(LNHODQGS³managers are called upon acting on  
facts rather than on beliefs, personal experience, and politicking, and to continually test, probe, and 
experiment with their approaches to the organization´6WDFH\SWith regards to the focus 
of this paper conversing about what a good 30³is´ DQG WKHUHIRUHZKDWDJRRG30³does´6WDFH\
(2010, p. 17²18) gives some examples of various studies about particular management techniques 
(e.g. Total Quality Management, Business Process Re-HQJLQHHULQJVKRZLQJ³discrepancies between 
the discourse of these systems and the reliability of their practice´ S:KHUH WRJR IURPWKHUH"
Leading thinkers such as Jackson and Stacey suggest holistic approaches based on systems thinking 
and creative holism through Total Systems Intervention and Critical Systems Practice (Jackson, 2003), 
and on Complex Responsive Processes perspective (Stacey, 2010) along with the related tools and 
techniques (Stacey, 2012).  
 
On the theoretical side, Hodgson (2002) and Cicmil & Hodgson (2006) have discussed how 
standards, best practices and other bodies of knowledge governed by a tradition of natural science, 
narrow the role of the project manager class making them "implementers" and "marginalising their 
wider potential role as competent social and political actors in complex project-labelled arrangements" 
(Cicmil & Hodgson, 2006, p. 11). They emphasize the fact that classification (e.g. the "PMP" class) 
(Hacking, 2002b, p. 7) and names (e.g. agreed terminology and meaning) (Hacking, 2002b, p. 9) 
contribute to reinforce the general idea that "managers face an objective reality which they can control 
by applying suitable methods for a rational assessment of the problematic situation in order to come 
up with the correct solution" (Cicmil & Hodgson, 2006, p. 12). Hodgson & Cicmil (2007) demonstrate 
how the reification of these organizational objects leads to their naturalization, excluding alternative 
representations or classifications, and provide to this a rationalistic basis for "epistemic communities" 
(Hodgson & Cicmil, 2007, p. 435) and control (and the so-called "professionalization") of the 
"discipline" (Hodgson, 2002).  The authors argue rightly "that the establishment of universal 
knowledge of this kind implies a loss of a reflexive and embodied rationality in favour of abstract 
principles and blind faith in universal techniques (Townley, 2002). Bowker and Star (1999, p. 319) 
DUJXH WKDWFODVVLILFDWLRQ µWLHVDSHUVRQ LQWRDQ LQIUDVWUXFWXUH ± into a set of work practices, beliefs, 
narrativeVDQGRUJDQL]DWLRQDOURXWLQHV¶" (Hodgson & Cicmil, 2007, p. 445). Alvesson & Spicer (2012) 
make clear that this normalization of knowledge leads people to refrain from using their cognitive and 
reflexive FDSDFLW\OHDGLQJWR³functional stupidity´$OYHVVRQ	6SLFHUS 
 
These few developments illustrate an important phenomenon: the dissatisfaction in face of 
problems, antinomies, perplexities and contradictions. "We feel we have overcome our ancestors, 
when in fact we are reworking the very sources of their dissatisfaction in new ways." (Hacking, 2002b, 
p. 2). Aristotle says that right method in philosophy begin by noticing contradictions in popular belief, 
or conflict between general opinion and the beliefs of the wise. In order to come back to the empirical 
dynamic of facts, various authors in project management suggest a shift to a post-modern stance 
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considering what people do in project context and situations (e.g. see critical studies (Hodgson, 2002; 
Cicmil &Hodgson, 2006; Hodgson & Cicmil, 2007; Cicmil et al., 2009), practice-turn (Blomquist et al., 
2010; Hällgren & Lindahl, 2012), phronetic approach (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Flyvbjerg et al., 2012), 
new institutional theories and conventions theory (Bredillet, 2003)). One commonalty amongst these 
approaches is the IRFXV RQ WKH ³practice´ ³do´) and the recognition of the role of power, actors' 
positions, values and agendas in the construction and use of knowledge.  
 
We face therefore this paradoxical situation of having  
 
-­‐ on the one hand classifications of phenomena governed by a tradition of "natural sciences", 
rationality, universality, objective reality and value-free decision making (e.g. Cicmil & 
Hodgson, 2006, p.11) exemplified by the development of 'Standards' and 'Bodies of 
Knowledge' and; 
-­‐ on the other hand "the organizational reality, which is often messy, ambiguous, fragmented 
and political in character" (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000, p. 60) leading to the quest of Verstehen.  
 
Post-modern ³SUDFWLFHWXUQ´ 
 
Revisiting the modernist assumptions 
 
If we want to make sense of this debate, we need to go behind the surface of the opinions, and 
revisit the very assumptions on which the normative perspective is grounded.  
 
Uncertainty 
 
The future is unknown and actions, taking place overtime, are fundamentally subject to 
uncertainty, i.e. indeterminacy of information and lack of knowledge about the future events or states 
(Von Mises, 1949). This fundamental aspect requests some development as it is the cornerstone of 
the reasoning and of the conversation. In relation to future, deliberation (judgment and decision-
PDNLQJDQGLQKHUHQWXQFHUWDLQW\$ULVWRWOHQRWHG³But we only deliberate about things which seem to 
admit of issuing in two ways; as for those things which cannot in the past, present, or future be 
otherwise, no one deliberates about them, if he supposes that they are such; for nothing would be 
gained by it´ $ULVWRWOHED.UDDLMHQEULQN SFDOOV IRUJLYLQJXQFHUWDLQW\DPRUH
explicit place in management theorizing and research. 
 
On a neoclassical economics standpoint, the assumption made by the standard model is that the 
rules of the game are stable: decision made on the basis of calculation (utility) supported by 
information today will still make sense in the future. Thus two kinds of information must be reliable: the 
information about the future state of the rules of the game, and the information about the decision to 
be made. However, as stated by Knight (1921), the future is unknown, and therefore, in this context of 
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fundamental uncertainty (Dequech, 2011) information transfer is not sufficient to ensure coordination 
between agents. Under conditions of fundamental uncertainty, self-interested agents cannot act 
rationally, according to neoclassical economics, i.e. cannot calculate ex ante as they lack of stable 
information and means of evaluation. The ways of coping with uncertainty in management actions and 
decision making has been widely discussed and lead to define uncertainty in many ways. Many 
authors refer to Knight (1921) (external environment, asymmetric information and related market 
perspective) (on Knight see: LeRoy & Singell, 1987; Runde, 1998; Jarvis, 2010) and to Keynes 
(known unknowns: «WKHUHLVQRVFLHQWLILFEDVLVRQZKLFKWRIRUPDQ\FDOFXODEOHSUREDELOLW\ZKDWHYHU
We simply do not know." (Keynes, 1937, pp. 113±114) (on Keynes see: Davidson, 1995, Dow, 1995). 
 
If we take an organization WKHRU\ VWDQGSRLQW WKH RUJDQL]LQJ FRQWH[W GHVFULEHG DV ³Chaordic´
(Hock, 1995), shows increasing volatility, uncertainty, ambiguity and complexity affecting organizations 
and the socio-economic environment within which they operate. Two main dimensions are considered 
having a key impact in organizational studies and organizing: uncertainty, and its two dimensions: 
volatility and ambiguity, and complexity. Because action (e.g. the making of organizing via maturity 
models takes place over time), and because the future is unknowable, action is inherently uncertain 
(Aristotle, 1926a, 1357a). Acts involve time, irreversibility, indeterminacy and contingence, uncertainty 
and therefore risk. Volatility, as rate and unpredictability of change in an environment over time which 
create uncertainty about future conditions, and ambiguity, as degree of uncertainty inherent in 
perceptions of the environmental state irrespective of its change over time, are therefore two 
dimensions of uncertainty (Carlson et al., 2006, p. 1059). Stacey (2010, p. 53) makes clear that the 
reality of uncertainty is linked to the complexity aspect of organizational reality and the 
interdependence of agents (people, organizations) and of thHLUDFWLRQV³Is the future given, or is it in 
SHUSHWXDO FRQVWUXFWLRQ"´ (Prigogine, 1997). If management practices and models rely on the 
causalities of certainty, their ability to address the complex and uncertain world seems to be 
questionable, under the organizational theory lens.  
 
Interpretation of information 
 
The inherent uncertainty, about information and lack of knowledge about future events or states, 
challenges the neoclassical economics assumptions of information transparency. Agents need to 
interpret (coding / decoding) the information in order to make sense of it, and information is not a kind 
RI ³SXUH´ IORZ 7KXV DJHQWV¶ DFWLRQV FDQQRW EH DV VWDWHV QHRFODVVLFDO HFRQRPLFV WKHRU\ RQO\ WKH
product of rational calculation, where the information is fully accessible and transparent (Gomez, 2006, 
p. 220). 
 
Interdependency and cooperation 
 
Considering the conditions of fundamental uncertainty and the resulting necessary information 
interpretation, rather than transparent information, leads to raise the questions of consensus, the 
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problem of double contingency, and the challenge of cooperation. Contrasting the neoclassical 
approach, the assumption of pre-existing norms binding the decisions and actions of the agents 
cannot be hold relevant in a contexWRISHUSHWXDOPRYHPHQWDQGWUDQVIRUPDWLRQ+HQFH³consensus is 
but one possibility for interaction´ +HUQHV	%DNNHQS6RFLDOV\VWHPVHYROXWLRQ LV in 
HVVHQFHWUDQVIRUPDWLYHDQGQRWGHWHUPLQLVWLF6WDFH\7KXV³contingency lies in the interaction 
rather than at the abstracted level of norms and, as such, it sets the stage for the emergence of the 
social system. Social order should not be explained transcendentally, but as a circular movement that 
has neither beginning nor end (LuhmanQ 	6FKRUU ´ (Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 1518). For 
/XKPDQQ¶V  QRUPV GHYHORS RYHU WLPH QRW LQ DQ HYROXWLRQDU\ ³natural and inescapable´ ZD\
(Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 1518), but in a transformative way (Stacey, 2010, p. 58). Thus, according 
to Luhmannian perspective and complex systems perspective: 
 
³a cooling of the assumption of the importance of common norms may well help us better 
understand how cooperation forms in less institutionalized organizations such as virtual and 
temporary organizations, where the assumption about the prevalence of norms particular to the 
organization in question is less applicable´+HUQHV	%DNNHQS 
 
The inherent interpretation of information and the fact consensus and cooperation are not the 
stable and deterministic result of a double contingency coming from some transcendental norms and 
values but rather the transformative fruit of interactions within social systems have a major implication 
in the way we should consider the design, the role(s) and relevance of management practices and 
models. Despite the inherent complexity of organizational phenomena and uncertainty about the 
future, agents make choice and act, which involves the existence of some mechanisms enabling to 
cope with uncertainty and make decisions. How would agents be able act in the absence of structure 
for calculating the likely outcomes of the actions leads? (Gomez & Jones, 2000, p. 696). Our point is 
WKDW FRQYHQWLRQV DV GHILQHGEHORZ FORVH WKH JDSEHWZHHQ ³free will [of calculating individuals seen 
under the lens of neoclassical economics] and social context [social determinism under the 
structuralist lens] interact to produce both structure and action´*RPH]	-RQHVSS
[our addition]).  
 
Thus, by not limiting the analysis of management practices and models to neoclassical economics 
and to organizational equilibrium-based and process-based theories, we wish to open up for 
alternative explanations of how agents with divergent values and orders of worth achieve cooperation, 
coordination and regulation, the overarching purpose of management practices and PRGHOV³The idea 
that common norms are not a sine qua non for social action enables a broader repertoire of 
organizational forms to enter into the analysis´ +HUQHV& Bakken, 2003, p. 1518). The alternative 
explanations we suggest build on a holistic recursivity-based approach (Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 
1524) including aspects such as self-reference, self-producing systems (Luhmann, 1992, p. 1422, 
Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 1513; Seidl, 2007, p. 202; Stacey, 2010, p. 204; Stacey, 2012, p. 9 
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Verstehen 
 
Kraaijenbrink (2010, p. 2) states "Management though is rarely like that [certainty with managers 
as theory-applying rational decision-makers] and managers only really matter when there is 
uncertainty" (Kraaijenbrink, 2010, p. 2). The conclusion is that rationalist or positivist classical theories 
aiming at predicting and explaining management practice are only partly useful. Soft problem 
situations, and even the hardest of problems novelty have their soft spots, involve interweaving 
understanding and acting (Soros, 1987, p. 42²43; Tsoukas & Papoulias, 1996, p. 74²75, see 
similarly Lalonde et al, 2012, p; 426 "even 'cold hard facts' may therefore be thought of as having a 
degree of 'plasticity'"). "The result is that the stable regularities requisite for employing the scientific 
method reliably can be obtained only tentatively" (Sayer, 1984).  
 
By contrast, to the pseudo-quantitative or mathematical methods, which distort and oversimplify, 
human action is accomplished by the use of Verstehen ³the intuitive quickness of enlightened 
understanding´6FKW]S7KLVFDQEHUHODWHGWRWKHQotion of relevance by feasibility (Le 
0RLJQH  S  DQG ,QJHQLXP ³DQ µLQWHOOLJHQW¶ DFWLRQ µLQJHQLXP¶ the mental faculty which 
makes possible to connect in a fast, suitable and happy way the separate things´ DV VWDWHG E\ /H
Moigne (1995, 2007, p. 118), quoting Vico (1708).  
 
Additionally, the Aristotelian teleological understanding of the world implies to consider individuals 
and objects according to the purposes they have and the role they have to play. (Maclntyre, 1985, p. 
57²59; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 669²670). Lalonde at al. (2012) explain that the creativity in 
the management of projects stem from the unstable balance between the real and the preferable, 
between the physical world and the world of intentionality and preference. (Lalonde et al., 2012, p. 
428). As Perminova et al. (2008) rightly state: "the way uncertainty is perceived by project managers 
GHSHQGV RQ SHUVRQDO VNLOOV LQWXLWLRQ DQG MXGJPHQW« 0DQDJHUV
 DWWLWXGHV DQG XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI
uncertainty do not create or eliminate it" (Perminova et al., 2008, p. 77). Judging the contextual 
uncertainty is a goal-oriented and reflective intuitive process and not a rational one in a 'controlled 
environment'. A consequence of the teleological understanding is that there are no abstract or 
ahistorical individuals, but persons defined by and interacting with historical, social, and cultural 
contexts. (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 57²59).   
 
This shift of perspective involves moving from evaluative judgments in abstracto based on list of 
attributes, to factual statements in concreto based on what is done in a particular situation and context. 
Borrowing to Tsoukas & Cummings (1997), answering to the question "What is a good captain" is not 
about providing a list of attributes "good captains" share, but to highlight what those recognised as 
good captains do. (Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 670).  In the project management context, we can 
illustrate this by the difference between projects managers recognized as being good professionals, 
because they own a credential supported by knowledge-based standards and list of related attributes 
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such as years of experience, or by the recognition of the demonstrable evidence-based performance 
in what they do (performance-based standards).  
 
Consequently, far seeing in the uncertainty inherent to action being a tyranny of the particular, of 
the local, and of the timely to be escaped (Toulmin 1990, p. 30±35), we rather see a place for 
HPDQFLSDWLRQ +DEHUPDV*DGDPHU DQG IUHHGRPHQDEOLQJ WRGHOLEHUDWH LQD ³prudent´
manner (Phrónêsis DQG WR DFW WR FUHDWH µD¶ GHVLUDEOH IXWXUH &RPPHQWLQJ RQ WKH DQFLHQW *UHHN
conception of politics, Castoriadis (1991) clarifies thus:  
 
"If the human world were fully ordered, either externally or through its own "spontaneous 
operation", if human laws were given by God or by nature or by the "nature of society" or by the 
"laws of history", then there would be no room for political thinking and no sense in asking what 
the proper law is or what justice is. [...] If a full and certain knowledge (epistêmê) of the human 
domain were possible, politics would immediately come to an end [...]" (Castoriadis (1991, p. 104).  
 
Thus "in the social domain in general, and in organizations in particular, uncertainty, ambiguity and 
politics must go together". (Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 671). Stark (2000, p. 4) proposes that 
³entrepreneurship is the ability to keep multiple orders of worth in play and to exploit the resulting 
ambiguity´ ,Q SURMHFW VLWXDWLRQV /DORQGH HW DO  UHFRJQL]H WKat "the relationships established 
between the actors' cognitive schemas and perceptions of the situation, is an uncertain state of affairs. 
The actors do not deal with clear-cut situations. Indeed, projects by their very nature tend to expand." 
(Lalonde et al., 2012, p. 425).   
 
However, the shift of perspective, from standard to Verstehen, is not per se sufficient to fully grasp 
what a good PM does, as it leaves us with a fundamental dichotomy: theory vs. practice or general vs. 
specific. At the heart of the modern and post-modern dichotomous thinking is the question of 
classifications. As Hacking (2002b) offers, and this view is fully embedded in the holistic recursivity-
based approach (Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 1524) above-mentioned: 
 
"The human and the social science do not differ from natural ones primarily because they deal in 
what are called social constructions, or because they require 'Verstehen' rather than explanation, 
prediction and control. They differ because there is a dynamical interaction between the 
classifications developed in the social science, and the individuals or behaviour classified." 
(Hacking, 2002b, p. 10).   
 
Pre-modern: return to praxis 
 
Moving beyond this dichotomous thinking involves shifting our focus from Philosophy of Science to 
3KLORVRSK\ RI 3UDFWLFH DQG WRZDUG D UHFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQ RU UHGLVFRYHU\ RI WKH FRQFHSW RI ³do´ $V
noticed above, paradoxically and interestingly, in their quest for the so-called post-modernism, many 
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DXWKRUV EXLOG RQ ³pre-modern´ SKLORVRSKLHV VXFK DV Whe Aristotelian one (e.g. MacIntyre,1985; 
7VRXNDV	&XPPLQJV)O\YEMHUJ%ORPTXLVWHWDO/DORQGHHWDO³Revisiting 
the past, creating the future´ KDYH EHHQ DGYRFDWHG E\ 6|GHUOXQG 	*HUDOGL (2012, p. 559) in their 
guest editorial of a Special Issue of the International Journal of Managing Projects in Business.  
 
In the following conversation, we suggest a return to Aristotle in order to address the question 
³ZKDWLVDJRRG30"´LH³ZKDWGRHVDJRRG30GR"´$VKRZQDERYHEHLQJDJRRG30LVQRWDERXW
GRLQJ ³PRUH RI WKH VDPH´ %UHGLOOHW  +RGJVRQ  +RGJVRQ 	 &LFPLO  EXW LQYROYHV
verstehen (Schütz, 1964). But the post-PRGHUQ ³SUDFWLFHZRUOG´ LV QRW HQRXJK WRPRYH EH\RQG WKH
dichotomous thinking abovementioned. We VXJJHVWUHFRQFHSWXDOLV]LQJDQGRUUHGLVFRYHULQJWKH³GR´
WKURXJKDSUD[HRORJLFDOVW\OHRIUHDVRQLQJ³Do´LVUHGHILQHGWRHQFRPSDVVERWKZD\VRINQRZLQJ$1'
acting (the related experience DQG³SUDFWLFH´), and knowledge forms, thus DJHQHUDOWKHRU\RI³do´ LV
outlined with its implication with regards to eudaimonia (well-being, human good), praxis and 
Phrónêsis, as well as ethics and politics.  
 
Dichotomous thinking 
 
:LWK UHJDUGV WR WKHFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQRI WKH ³do´we discuss here three important dichotomies, 
resulting from classifications in use in social science and related theories, source of limitations both in 
our knowing and in our acting: 1) Theory vs. Practice, 2) Practice vs. Phronetic WXUQDQG³6FKRODUV´
YV³3UDFWLWLRQHUVQDWLYHVRIVLWXDWLRQV´ 
 
Theory vs. Practice 
 
On the one hand, although there is little agreement about a definition of what a theory is (Gioia & 
Pitre, 1990, p. 587; Sutton & Staw, 1995, p. 372; Corley & Gioia, 2011, p. 12), we can use a general 
GHILQLWLRQIRULQVWDQFH7KHRU\LV³an ordered set of assertions about a generic behaviour or structure 
assumed to hold throughout a significantly broad range of specific instances´6XWKHUODQGS
Boxenbaum & Rouleau, 2011, p. 274). On the other hand, the contemporary thinkers have 
FRPPHQWHGWKHFRQFHSWRI³SUD[LV´and raised the risk of losing an intimate understanding leading to 
VRPHGLOXWLRQRILWVEDVLFPHDQLQJLQWR³DFWLYLW\´³All praxis is an activity, but not all activity is praxis´
(Vazquez, 1977, p. 149). Activity includes lively action or movement, any specific deed, pursuit, the 
state or quality of being active. Warry (1992) observes that the term praxis is used as a synonym for 
practice. Furthermore, ³the analytic impoverishment of praxis signals a larger problem within 
anthropology: the division between theory and application´:DUU\S:HPXVWUHWXUQWR
the roots of the concept and explicit it. Vazquez (1977) offers a clear and simple definition of the term 
ZKHQKHZURWH³3UD[LV«LVWKHFHQWUDOFDWHJRU\RIWKHSKLORVRSK\ZKLFKLVQRWPHUHO\DQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ
RIWKHZRUOGEXWLVDOVRDJXLGHWRLWVWUDQVIRUPDWLRQ«´9D]TXH]S3UD[LVLVDSDUWLFXODU
form of activity, a reflexive activity underlying a rational action. It is concerned with change, is present 
and future oriented, requires anticipation of the effect of action, rather than the interpretation of past or 
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prior event (Vazquez, 1977, p. 169; Warry, 1992, p. 156). PrD[LVLV³a specific form of activity based on 
knowledge informed by theory and performed according to certain ethical and moral principles for 
political ends´:DUU\S3UD[LVRIIHUVDQLPSRUWDQWIRFXVIRUSUDFWLWLRQHUVDQGUHVHDUFKHUV
in social science, one in which theory is integrated with practice at the point of intervention. Praxis, as 
a particular form of activity, can serve as a focal point through which the discursive testing of theory is 
grounded through decision making and experience (Habermas, 1973, p. 20). Simply stated, praxis can 
serve as a common ground for those interested in basic and applied research by providing knowledge 
of the reality in which action, informed by theory, takes place (Warry, 1992, p. 156).  
 
However, these definitions do not pay a full tribute to the richness of meanings and nuances 
embedded in the Aristotelian gnoseology. Eikeland (2007, 2008, 2012) and Eikeland & Nicolini (2011) 
DSWO\GLVFXVV$ULVWRWOH³gnoseology´(LNHODQGDQGHPSKDVL]HWKDWWKHlimitations of the modern 
and post-modern appropriation of Aristotle philosophy5, especially with regards to the lack of 
understanding of nuances between the various concepts (virtues, ways of knowing and knowledge 
forms) and the willingness to categorize these concepts as being independent and therefore miss a 
fundamental point: for Aristotle, and for the move beyond dichotomous thinking, here theory vs. 
SUDFWLFH³Theôría was not just speculation and calculation from a separate and insulated observatory´ 
:KLOH PHDQLQJ ³something like studying for the purpose of understanding and truth, without 
intervening, and without the study being subordinated to or serving to promote any immediate plans 
IRU VSHFLILF DFWLRQV RI DQ\ NLQG >«@ DFTXLUHG SUDFWLFDO SDUWLFipant experience (Empeiría) was 
necessary´ (Eikeland, 2008, p. 46²47).  
 
Drawing on Eikeland (2007; 2012) we can summarize some key aspects of Aristotle gnoseology.   
 
Relational ways of knowing 
 
Aristotle¶V thinking about knowledge is fundamentally and explicitly relational. The knower and the 
known always relate to each other in a specific way. Relationships between means and ends are also 
specific to the different ways of knowing. The ethico-political consequences of the different ways of 
knowing are also explicitly considered.  
 
7ZRIRUPVRI³WKHRU\´ and epistêmê 
 
³«HSLVWrPrWKDWLVIRUNQRZOHGJHWKDWZDVVWDELOLVHGDQGSUHWW\VHFXUHDERXWVXEMHFWVWKDWZHUH
for the most part or always stablHDQGUHJXODUWKHPVHOYHV´(Eikeland, 2007, p. 350).  
                                                                                                                                
5    
^ĞĞŝŬĞůĂŶĚ͕ϮϬϬϳ͕Ɖ͘ϯϰϳ͘ŶĚĞ͘Ő͘͞Scientific  methods  are  usually  specialised  techniques  quite  different  from  
and  extraneous  to  the  ways  of  producing  knowledge  prevalent  in  our  everyday  lives.  This  goes  even  for  the  
͞ƉŽƐƚ-­‐ŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƐƚ͕͟ƌĞůĂƚŝǀŝƐƚ͕ĂŶĚĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀŝƐƚĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƐŐƌĂĚƵĂůůǇďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵ͕ǁŚŝĐŚŽĨƚĞŶƐĞĞŵ
to  move  to  the  opposite  extreme  of  making  all  forms  of  knowledge  epistemologically  equivalent.  But  these  
modernist,  or  post-­‐modernist,  ways  of  thinking  are  insufficient  for  understanding  both  knowledge  and  ethics.͟
(Eikeland,  2007,  p.  348)  
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The first form, called epistêmê1 or theôría, where like in grammar there is no physical distance 
EHWZHHQWKHNQRZHUDQGWKHNQRZQ³7KLVPHDQVWKDWWKHVXEMHFWVVWXGLHG± our own forms of practice 
± PXVWEH³UHLILHG´UHIOHFWLYHO\ LQRUGHUWREHJUDVSHGVLQFH they are not really outside us or outside 
RXUSUDFWLFHVDWDOO´(LNHODQGS(LNHODQGS)XUWKHUPRUH³Theôría«LVDERXW
SURFHHGLQJIURPZLWKLQDQDFWLYLW\PDNLQJLWV³JUDPPDU´H[SOLFLWRSHQLQJQHZSRVVLELOLWLHVIRUDFWLRQ
and inIRUPLQJ PLQGIXO FDULQJ DQG ZLVH FRQGXFW « :KHQ FRQFHLYHG DQG IRUPXODWHG DIWHU D
JUDPPDWLFDOPRGHOWKHRU\DV³Theôría´WKXVEHFRPHVDUHVRXUFHWREHXVHGLQDFWLRQDQGIRUDFWLRQ
to produce emancipatory visibilisation and expansive articulation³(LNHODnd & Nicolini, 2011, p. 169).  
 
The second form, called theôrêsis or epistêmê2 LV³EDVHGRQREVHUYDWLRQDWDGLVWDQFH7KH{UrVLV
relates to external objects without intervening. The relation implied between the knower and the 
known, is difference, distance, separation, non-interaction, and non-LQWHUIHUHQFH H[ DVWURQRP\´
(Eikeland, 2007, p. 349; Eikeland, 2012, p. 21).  
 
)RUPVRI³SUDFWLFH´ 
 
³For Aristotle, praxis knowledge represents a relationship between colleagues sharing common 
standards for how to go about their professional activities³(LNHODQGS(LNHODQGS
26).  
 
Praxis1, dialogue & dialectics: ³WKH ZD\ RI OHDUQLQJ RU UHVHDUFK PRYLQJ ³XS´ IURP KRZ WKLQJV
appear to us phenomenologically to an articulated insight in basic principles «searching patterns, 
similarities DQG GLIIHUHQFHV LQ RXU DFFXPXODWHG SUDFWLFDO H[SHULHQFH«´ (LNHODQG  S 
Eikeland, 2012, p. 27). +RZHYHU ³critical dialogue needs relief from immediate pressure to DFW´
(Eikeland, 2012, p. 29), and ³DSHUPDQHQWVNKROrOHLVXUH - open, free space - school) embedded in 
practical settings is needed, making it possible to develop, unfold, and articulate the "grammars" of 
different social settings´(LNHODQGS).   
 
Praxis2SKUyQrVLV ´WKHZD\GRZQ IURP ³WKHRU\´ WR ³SUDFWLFH´ «WKHSUDFWLFDOHQDFWPHQW LVRIWHQ
LPPHGLDWHDQGVSRQWDQHRXV«EXWLQRWKHUILHOGVZKHUHWKHSUDFWLFHLVQRWHTXDOO\VWDQGDUGLVHGDQG
³DXWRPDWHG´ IRU H[DPSOH LQ HWKLFV WKH ³DSSOLFDWLRQ´ of general competence or of the knowledge of 
principles provided by ethical virtues like justice, courage, friendliness, honesty, etc., needs 
deliberation or phrónêsis, trying to find out how to act in the most just or fair way towards someone 
right here and now. The point is that the way from theory to practice within this kind of knowledge is 
not deductive, nor does it go by some form of technical calculation of effects. And it was never 
intended to be deductive or calculative by Aristotle´(LNHODQG7, p. 352; Eikeland, 2012, p. 31; text 
emphasized by us).   
 
The other forms (pathos, khrêsis, poíêsis) are included in the following overview (Table 1).  
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Moving away from any dichotomous thinking, we can tentatively summarize the interdependence 
between theory, practice: kQRZOHGJH ³HPEHGGHG´ LQ SUDFWLFH DQG H[SHULHQFH ZD\V RI NQRZLQJ ± 
whatever it is tacit (Polanyi, 1962, 1966), implicit (Nonaka, 1994) or explicit knowledge (Gourlay, 2006) 
± is transformed and translated into, and is recursively and reflexively informed and transformed by, 
theory.  
 
---------------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
The ³SUDFWLFHWurn´ is not enough 
 
A vast amount of literature (e.g. Bourdieu, 1990; de Certeau, 1984; Foucault, 1977; Giddens, 
1979) has been published since the early 1980s dealing with practice in social theory (Schatzki et al., 
2001; Reckwitz, 2002), e.g. strategy-as-practice (for an overview, see Jarzabkowski et al., 2007; 
Carter et al., 2008; Rasche & Chia, 2009; Vaara & Whittington, 2012). These works aim at overcoming 
the dualism between 'individualism' and 'societism' (Schatzki³Practice theorist aim to respect 
both the efforts of individual actors and the workings of the social´ :KLWWLQJWRQS7KH
three core themes for practice theory (practices, praxis and practitioners)6 are forming interrelated 
parts of a whole (Giddens, 1984). In the project management context, the practice turn, strongly 
inspired by the strategy as practice stream, has gained momentum (e.g. Bredillet, 2004; Bechky, 2006; 
Cicmil, 2006; Cicmil et al., 2006; Hällgren & Wilson, 2008; Blomquist et al., 2010; Hällgren & 
Söderholm, 2011; Sanderson, 2012). Vaara & Whittington (2012) make clear that the practice turn 
³defines itself in opposition to methodological individualism´KRZ³praxis relies on practices´DQG³how 
social structures and human agency link together in the explanation of action´9DDUD	:KLWWLQJWRQ
2012, p. 288).  
 
Brown (2012, p. 446²447) explores similarities and differences between practice (i.e. Varaa & 
Whittington, 2012) and phronetic turns (i.e. Flyvbjerg, 2004), summarized in Table 2. As he specifies, 
³no attempt at reconciliation will be made ± any such attempt could only succeed by introducing 
unproductive distortions´%URZQS:KLOH%URZQDQDO\VLVLVYHU\UHOHYDQWDQGUHOLHVRQDQ
Aristotelian Phrónêsis, it seems he misses one key point raised by Eikeland (2008): the phronetic turn 
FDQ EH EDUHO\ VDLG ³$ULVWRWHOLDQ´ RU URRWHG LQ D Uelevant interpretation of Phrónêsis for one major 
UHDVRQ WKH ³H[SHUW´ RU ³SKURQHWLF UHVHDUFKHU´ UHPDLQV DQ RXWVLGHU WR WKH ³SUDFWLFH´ DQG WKLV LV LQ
contradiction with Aristotelian thought (for a full critique of phronetic social science, and aspects linked 
to misconception of epistêmê, value ±rationality, see Eikeland, 2008, pp. 43²44 and note 28).  
 
                                                                                                                                
6  These  concepts  are  usually  defined  as  follow:  praxis  (Project  Management-­‐as-­‐Praxis,  activity  involved  in  
project  making),  practices  (various  tools,  norms,  and  procedures  of  project  work),  and  practitioners  (actors  
involved  in,  or  seeking  to  influence,  project  making).  
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-------------------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
Therefore the practice lens offers a contrasted classification of perspectives with regards to 
practice (acting) and knowledge & competence development and their mutual relation:  
 
-­‐ WKH³SUDFWLFHWXUQ´FDQEHVHHQDVVWLOOURRWHGLQDNLQGRI³VRFLDOVFLHQWLILF´VSLULW± attempting to 
balance rigor and relevance ± ZLWKDJHQHUDOIRFXVRQ³NQRZOHGJHDQGLQTXLU\µIRU¶DQGµDERXW¶
DQGHYHQµLQ¶SUDFWLFH´.RQGUDWS 
-­‐ ZKLOH WKH SKURQHWLF SURSRVDO VXJJHVWV PRYLQJ IURP D ³WXUQ´ WR D ³UHYROXWLRQ´ D ³SUDFWLFH
UHYROXWLRQ´ZLWKDQLPSDFWRQVRFLHW\± IRFXVLQJRQUHOHYDQFHDQGWKDW³RXUNQRZLQJLVµLQ¶RXU
DFWLRQ´(Schön, 1983, p. 49). Maturana & Varela (1998, p. 27²29) similarly define knowing as 
³effective action´DQGZULWH WKDW ³all doing is knowing, and all knowing is doing´ ,Q3UDFWLFH
WKHRU\ZRUGV*LGGHQVSH[SOLFDWHVNQRZOHGJHDELOLW\DV³inherent within the ability to 
µJRRQ¶ZLWKLQWKHURXWLQHVRIVRFLDOOLIH´ 
 
We argue that, in the context of temporary-based organizations and inherent fundamental 
uncertainty, WKH ³SUDFWLFH´ ZRUOG LV QRW HQRXJK to fully capture the mutual relationships between 
practice (ways of knowing) and theory for the following reasons:  
 
1. ,WGRHVQ¶WDGGUHVVZHOOWKHWHPSRUDU\-based organizing phenomena; 
2. It is anchored in a dichotomous thinking about scholars vs. practitioners (the knowers and the 
knows), and practice vs. theory; 
3. Given the GLFKRWRPRXV WKLQNLQJ LW GRHVQ¶W IXOO\ FODULI\ WKH SUREOHP RI FRQFHSWXDOL]LQJ
³XQLYHUVDOV´RU³JHQHUDOWKHRU\´ 
 
Coming back to Packendorff (1995, p. 327) definition of temporary organizations (see note 3), we 
can state that the non-routine process and product involving explicit knowledge (proposition 1) is not 
WKH SULPDU\ IRFXV RI SUDFWLFH WXUQ DGYRFDWLQJ ³KDELWXV´ DQG URXWLQHV DQFKRUHG LQ WKH WDFLW DQG
sometimes implicit, dimension of knowledge7. Furthermore the conscious organizing efforts (i.e. not 
spontaneous self-organizing) (proposition 4) in a pluralistic context principle is in contradiction with the 
practice turn concept of unconscious behaviour and ideas such as pure spontaneous emergence of 
organizing phenomena. However, considering the Aristotelian relational ways of knowing in relation to 
what we could name its recursive and reflexive lens (Alvesson & Spicer, 2012, p. 1198), and the 
concept of self-reference (Luhmann, 1992, p. 1421; Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 1513) we can contend 
                                                                                                                                
7  While  addressing  the  knowledge  embedded  in  practice,  I  refer  to  Polanyi  (1962,  1966)  notion  of  tacit  
knowledge,  by  contrast  to  Nonaka  (1994)  notion,  emphasizing  more  the  "implicit"  dimension  in  articulation  
with  the  explicit  dimension  of  knowledge.  (Gourlay,  2006).  Tacit  knowledge  (Polanyi,  1962,  1966)  is  contextual,  
personal,  and  practice-­‐based.  It  cannot  be  made  explicit.  Implicit  knowledge  and  explicit  knowledge  can  be  
converted  back  and  forth  according  to  Nonaka's  SECI  cycle  (1994).    
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WKDW ³the individual independence is embodied in collective dependence´ *RPH]  S 
leading us to cool down this proposition.  
 
The time limitation of the temporary organization (proposition 3) and the performance evaluation 
(proposition 3) aspects involve the recognition of making means and ends explicit and collective 
deliberation and dialogue about them including facts and values that is the recognition of some degree 
of rationalization of everyday practice and experience with the support of analytic and epistemic effort 
³epistemic impulses´(LNHODQGSS:LWKUHJDUGVWRSUDFWLFHand theory, the empirical 
observation suggested by both the practice and phronetic proposals, while claiming rejecting any 
dualism (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011, p. 1241²1243), do not pay full tribute to the 
necessary acquired practical experience as way of knowing involving being native of situations and 
DFWLRQV(LNHODQGSDQGQRWMXVWDQ³HPSLULFDOREVHUYHU´RU³HQJDJHGVFKRODU´9DQGH9HQ
& Johnson, 2006). $V(LNHODQGSRVHV³knowledge and competence is increasingly developed 
from within practical contexts...´S%DVHGRQDFFXUDWHUHDGLQJRI$ULVWRWOH/DORQGHHWDO
DSWO\DGGUHVVWKLVSRLQW³This work [An empirical investigation of the project situation: PM practice as 
an inquiry process] should be considered, among others (e.g., Bourgault & Lagacé, 2002; Bourgault et 
al., 2006), as a vehicle for experiential or in-action teaching styles.´S>WH[WDGGHG@ 
 
And then comes WKH³UHIOH[LYHSUD[LWLWLRQHU´ 
 
7KHDVVXPSWLRQVDERXWWKH³divisions of labour between the researchers and the researched´S
Eikeland & Nicolini, 2011, p. 167), the roles, behaviours and expectations of the agents or actors, as 
framed by the classical classes' dichotomy between scholars and practitioners (Aram & Salipante, 
2003, p. 1900; Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006, p. 806), involved in knowledge creation and transfer is at 
the centre of the theory vs. practice and relevance vs. rigour debate. Some authors have pleaded for 
VRPH NLQG RI MXQFWLRQ RU LQWHJUDWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH ³VFKRODUV±experts± UHVHDUFKHUV´ DQG WKH
³PDQDJHUVZRUNHUV±practitioners±SDUWLFLSDQWV´ HJ UHFODLPLQJ WKH SUDFWLFDO .RQGUDW  S 
social science practitioner (Warry, 1992, p. 160); engaged scholars (Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006, p. 
803; Objectivism style of reasoning (Pouliot, 2007, p. 360), tipping point (Rynes et al., 2001, p. 1051), 
practitioners in the context of project-as-practice (Blomquist et al., 2010, p. 13); practitioner-researcher 
(Jarvis, 1999), and researcher-practitioner (Lalonde et al. 2012, note 8, p. 4298). We suggest that 
there is a need to go further in-depth to fully grasp the importance of moving to consider one single 
class of actors in project situations. Hacking (2002b), while reflecting about classifications posits that 
³The human and the social science «GLIIHU EHFDXVH WKHUH LV D G\QDPLFDO LQWHUDFWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH
classifications developed in the social science, and the individuals or behaviour classified´+DFNLQJ
                                                                                                                                
8  Following  the  Aristotelian  tradition,  Lalonde  et  al.  (2012)  refer  to  the  project  actor  ('praXitioner')  as  becoming  
a  phronimos:   "The   interest   in   theorizing   inquiry  practices   is   that   it   frees  professional   action   from  poiesis   and  
solely   instrumental   considerations   and   infuses   it   with   praxis.   That   is,   the   project   actor   has   the   potential   to  
become   a   'phronimos',   or   an   individual   endowed  with   practical   wisdom,   with   the   capacity   to   think   through  
increasingly   complex   project   situations   where   values   must   be   considered   in   light   of   critical   issues   for  
organizations,  communities  and  the  general  public."  (Lalonde  et  al.,  2012,  p.  430).    
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2002b, p. 10). He develops the idea of interactive classifications (Hacking, 2002b) and looping effects 
+DFNLQJDERXW³KRZFODVVLILFDWLRQVDIIHFWXVDQGKRZZHFUHDWHQHZFODVVHVDQHZ´ (Hacking, 
2002b, p.  $V D FRQVHTXHQFH PRYLQJ IURP WKH WZR FODVVHV GLFKRWRP\ ³VFKRODUV±experts±
UHVHDUFKHUV´ DQG WKH ³PDQDJHUVZRUNHUV±practitioners±SDUWLFLSDQWV´ WR RQH VLQJOH FODVV we name 
³praXitioners´LVDOOEXWQHXWUDOZLWKUHJDUGVWRDSUD[HRORJLFDOSUD[HRORJ\GHfined as study or science 
of human actions and conduct, i.e. praxis) style of reasoning (Hacking, 2002b, p. 3) and to go beyond 
the theory vs. practice / rigour vs. relevance gap. I maintain that this move away from the current 
dichotomy may contribute to create new perspectives through a new class and open up new ways of 
thinking and acting in project situations. The name praXitioner is both related to praxis, and to what 
6WDFH\ QDPHV ³reflexive practitioner´ in contract with WKH ³UHIOHFWLYH SUDFWLWLRQHU´ (Schön, 1983), 
³because reflexive practices involves noticing and thinking about participation with others in the 
accomplishment of joint tasks >«@ 5HIOH[LYH SUDFWLFH LV PRUH WKDQ UHIOHFWLYH SUDFWLFH EHFDXVH LW
involves people in more than reflection together on what they are doing, and that more is inquiring into 
KRZWKH\DUHWKLQNLQJDERXWZKDWWKH\DUHGRLQJ>«@5HIOH[LYLW\LVWKLQNLQJDERXWKRZZHDUHWKLQNLQJ´ 
(Stacey, 2012, p. 112). We VXJJHVWWKHUHIRUHDVKLIWIURPWKH³reflective practitioner´WRWKH ³reflexive 
SUD;LWLRQHU´ZKDW(LNHODQGQDPHVEHLQJ³native´(LNHODQGSS 
 
Toward a liberation praxeology 
 
After an investigation of the modern and post-modern perspectives about practice and its relation 
to theory, we recognize that  
 
-­‐ We are dissatisfied in face of the exposed problems, antinomies, perplexities and 
contradictions; As Hacking put it: "We feel we have overcome our ancestors, when in fact we 
are reworking the very sources of their dissatisfaction in new ways." (Hacking, 2002b, p. 2). 
Aristotle says that right method in philosophy begin by noticing contradictions in popular belief, 
or conflict between general opinion and the beliefs of the wise; 
-­‐ Practice and theory, in their relational, recursive and reflexive dimensions, should be 
embedded in practical contexts (Eikeland, 2008, p. 47); 
-­‐ A dialogical and or dialectical mode of thought and action should be privileged for moving 
away any dichotomous thinking and choosing one side of the dichotomy (Eikeland, 2008, p. 
48) and recognizing the whole dynamic of classification systems. Hacking (2002b, p. 4) states 
WKDWWKHHVVHQFHRIDVW\OHRIUHDVRQLQJLVFODVVLILFDWLRQ³and also something need for thought 
itself´(DFKVW\OHRIUHDVRQLQJLQWURGXFHVQHZREMHFWVQHZFODVVHVof objects generating new 
FODVVHV RI HQWLWLHV LH ³UHIOH[LYH SUD[LWLRQHU´ LH ³JRRG´ 30 DQG QHZ RQWR-epistemological 
debates about their reality and the way of knowing about them. It creates its own appropriate 
³YHU\FULWHULDRIWUXWK´ DQGLV³self-auWKHQWLFDWLQJ´ (Hacking, 2002b, p. 4).  
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We suggest therefore re-FRQFHSWXDOL]LQJWKH³GR´DOLEHUDWLRQSUD[HRORJ\DSUD[HRORJLFDOVW\OHRI
reasoning, unequivocally rooted in Aristotle philosophy, can offer such an integrative approach, and 
we outline below some key tenets of this approach. 
 
Praxeology 
 
Praxeology is defined as study or science of human actions and conduct, praxis and practices 
and, if its origin can tracked back to Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics (1926a), the word praxeology is 
accredited to Louis Bourdeau in his "Théorie des sciences" (1882, last but one chapter;Ostrowski, 
1967, p. 21). A presentation of the origins of Praxeology (Petruszewycz, 1965; Ostrowski, 1967), and 
more generally of works supported by a "praxeological intent9" (Petruszewycz, 1965, p. 13), through 
an anthology of historical literature shows the richness of the concept, spanning from Economics 
(Austrian School: Von Mises, Hayek, Penrose) to Political Science (Machiavelli, von Clausewitz, Aron), 
through Moral (La Fontaine, La Rochefoucauld), Philosophy (Descartes, Pascal, Leibniz), Novel 
(Balzac, Walder, Doyle, Poe), Social Psychology (Daval), Behaviorism (Watson), Mathematics & 
Probability (Pascal, Leibniz, Bernouilli), Theory of Risk & Economics (Massé), Games Theory & 
(FRQRPLF %HKDYLRU *XLOEDXG 9RQ 1HXPDQQ 7HNWRORJ\ ZLWK WKH FRQFHSW RI µFRQMXQFWLRQ¶ DFW RI
joining) and dialectical materialism (Bogdanov in Petruszewycz, 1965, p. 16 and in Le Moigne, 2007, 
S«DQGLWVFRPSUHKHQVLYHQHVV:HFDQPHQWLRQIXUWher development in the area of Education 
& Learning (Pascal & Bertram, 2012), Social science (Eikeland, 2012), Strategy-as-Practice (Rasche 
& Chia, 2009; Touskas, 2010; Vaara & Whittington, 2012, and Project-as-Practice (Blomquist et al., 
2010).  
 
Liberation 
 
Gutiérrez (1988), a Peruvian theologian and Dominican priest, is regarded as the founder of 
Liberation Theology. Liberation theology is a school of thought that explores the relationship between 
Christian theology and political activism, particularly in areas of social justice, poverty, and human 
rights. The main methodology of liberation theology is to do theology (i.e. speak of God) from the 
viewpoint of the economically poor and oppressed of the human community. The concept offers, for 
our conversation, more than just a metaphor.  
 
According to the Aristotelian praxeological perspective, we can put forward that the ultimate 
SXUSRVHRIDQ\³RUJDQL]DWLRQ´is achieving eudaimonia (human well-being, happiness) and social good 
WKURXJK³(WKLFV´$ULVWRWOHDDQGUHODWHG³3ROLWLFV´$ULVWRWOH5HDVRQLQJDERXWWHPSRUDU\
and project based organizing in a praxeological liberation lens is thus about knowing and acting, on 
the basis of Ethics and Politics, from the viewpoint of the development of well-being, happiness and 
social good. Furthermore, this liberation aspect is supported by the dialogical and dialectical mode of 
                                                                                                                                
9  One  can  speak  of  "praxeological  intent"  when  an  author  is  concerned  by  human  actions  in  a  sufficiently  
detached  manner,  either  for  techniques  and  means  (technological  studies),  and  for  ends  and  values  (moral  
studies)  (translation  by  the  author.  See  Petruszewycz,  1965,  p.  13)  
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reasoning and action suggested above and the recognition of the dynamic and interactive relationship 
with any classification systems we may consider; for e.g. everyday practices and arbitrary vs. non 
arbitrary standards (Eikeland, 2008, p. 26), differentiating organizing episodes (Tsoukas, 2010) vs. 
recognizing that, in the context of temporary based organizing, these episodes being intertwined and 
interacting with each other, universal vs. particular, general epistemic accounts vs. narratives and/or 
case studies, abstract vs. concrete, deductive vs. inductive vs. abductive logic, theoretical pluralism 
(Eikeland, 2008, pp. 42²43).  
 
7HQHWVRIDJHQHUDOWKHRU\RI³GR´ 
 
$EURDGHUFRQVLGHUDWLRQLVWKDWWKHZD\RIFRQFHSWXDOL]LQJ³XQLYHUVDOV´RU³JHQHUDOWKHRU\´KDVWR
be made clear. According to Eikeland (2008, pp. 25), three kind of traditions can be considered: 1) 
Covering laws (deductive nomological or hypothetico-deductive model), 2) Statistical generalizations 
DQG6WDQGDUGV+HUHVWDQGDUGVFDQEHGHILQHGDV³IL[HGSRLQWVRU³LGHDOV´ IRUSUDFWLWLRQHUVZLWKLQ
certain areas, saying something about what it means to perform a certain kind of activity competently 
or, according to a, saying something about what it means to perform a certain kind of activity 
competently or, according to certain quality.´ S  7KH PHDQLQJ GRHVQ¶W LQFOXGH VWDQGDUGV
understood as just average norms, arbitrary or imposed by external bodies (e.g Brunsson et al, 2000). 
Here, such standards are neither qualitatively nor quantitatively influenced by any counter facts. 
6WDQGDUGVDUHPDGHE\WKHVXFFHVVRIYLUWXRVRSHUIRUPHUVDQGWKH\³change when someone finds a 
better way of doing, making or using something´7KHNH\FKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIVXFKVWDQGDUGVDUHWKDW
³QRW HYHU\ERG\ VKRXOG RU FRXOG UHDOL]H WKHP HTXDOO\ RU IXOO\ >«@ WKHLU QRQ-arbitrary character, their 
LPPDQHQFH DV SDWWHUQV WR SUDFWLFH DQG ³ZD\V-of-doing-WKLQJV´ DQG WKHLU SUDFWLFDO LQHYLWDELOLW\ LQ
human life as either implicit or explicit, vague or more exact standards of measurement, as standards 
of validity of excellence´ S  &RQWUDU\ WR DUELWUDU\ VWDQGDUGV ZKLFK FDQ EH FRQYHQWLRQDO
unnecessary, or enforced, non-arbitrary standards are necessary as they express an existential 
necessity that is what it means to be or to do something. Such standards are to be observed 
practically from within the practice and they are impossible to be observed just from outside, by 
SHUFHSWLRQ7KHSRVLWLRQRIWKH³REVHUYHU´LVWKXVTXLWHGLIIHUHQWEHWZHHQWKHVHWKUHHWUDGLWLRQV,QWKH
FDVH RI ³VWDQGDUGV´ WKH REVHUYHU LV WKH SUDFWLWLRQHU WKH QDWLYH GHDOLQJ ZLWK WKLQJV DQG WKHRUL]LQJ
his/her own practice, and there is no dichotomy between practice and theory (Eikeland, 2008, p. 27).   
 
5HFRQFHSWXDOLVLQJWKH³GR´HXGDLPRQLDSUD[LVDQGPhrónêsis 
 
The mediating role of praxis and Phrónêsis 
 
At the heart of praxeology is the mediating role of praxis (as a way of knowing activity including a 
commitment to eudaimonia) and phrónêsis (as a knowledge form). For Aristotle (1926), the 
possession of three intellectual virtues (tékhnê (artistic or technical knowledge, craft), epistêmê (as 
theoretike ³WKHRUHWLFDO´ NQRZOHGJH DQG Phrónêsis (practical wisdom, prudence, but includes both 
Page 24 - 40 
intellectual excellence AND excellence of character), along with the possession of ethical virtues, 
enable an individual to achieve eudaimonia (well-being, happiness). Eudaimonia actually requires 
activity, action, exhibiting virtue (good character), and excellence in reason (rational activity). 
Phrónêsis, as knowledge form, is developed through a specific type of empeiria (practical acquired 
H[SHULHQFHD³way of knowing as activity´QDPHGSUD[LV(LNHODQGS 
 
We can now see the full quality of praxis. It is not simply action based on reflection. It is action 
which embodies certain qualities. These include a commitment to eudaimonia (well-being, happiness) 
and the search for truth, and respect for others. It is the action of people who are free, who are able to 
DFW IRU WKHPVHOYHV 0RUHRYHU SUD[LV LV DOZD\V ULVN\ ,W UHTXLUHV WKDW D SHUVRQ ³makes a wise and 
prudent practical judgement about how to act in this situation´&DUU	.HPPLVSTXRWHGLQ
Smith, 1999, 2011). Praxis as such aims at the liberation of individuals or communities from the 
alienating aspects of everyday practice subject to the hegemony of the rationalist forces constraining 
every day actions or activities. (Warry, 1992, p. 157; Frankenberg, 1988, p. 326²327). As Warry 
(1992, p. 157) puts it:  
 
³Praxis research requires the development of non-alienating methodologies that are dialogic and 
SDUWLFLSDWRU\ LQ QDWXUH >«@ 3UD[LV WKHQ LV QRW VLPSO\ DFWLYLW\ EXW D VSHFLILF IRUP RI DFWLYLW\
activity based on knowledge informed by theory and performed according to ethical and moral 
SULQFLSOHV IRUSROLWLFDO HQGV+DEHUPDVDQG*DGDPHUERWKSRLQW WR ³HPDQFLSDWRU\SUD[LV´ZKLFK
appeals to communicative practice aimed at overcoming incommensurable beliefs. Emancipatory 
praxis is a specific type of moral and political activity aimed at the liberation of individuals or 
communities from alienating aspects of everyday practices.´ 
 
With regards to knowledge, competence and ways of knowing as activities (i.e. practice), Eikeland 
 H[SODLQV WKDW ³knowledge and competence is increasingly developed from within practical 
FRQWH[WV«PDNLQJ RUJDQLVDWLRQDO OHDUQLQJ LQ ZRUN SODFHV DQG DOO FRRSHUDWLYH HQGHDYRXUV ± i.e. 
collective efforts, experiential learning and improvement ± increasingly important in general´SS²
22). This relation between knowing and practicing is also acknowledged by Weisinger & Salipante 
(2000): "The knowing is bound with the practicing of seemingly mundane actions « Nnowing as 
situated learning and practicing S7KH ORJLFRI ³.QRZLQJ-in-3UDFWLFH´ LV IXOO\ UHDOL]HG WKURXJK
³.QRZLQJ-as-3UDFWLFLQJ´ IROORZLQJ UHFXUVLYH ORJLF EHWZHHQ ³theorizing practice and practicing theory´
DQGWKHIDFWWKDW³theorizing practice is itself a practice´)HOGPDQ	2UOLNRZVNLS 
 
For Aristotle, praxis, Phrónêsis and ethics are inseparable. The aspects of values, ethics are fully 
embedded in the teleological perspective. As Aristotle (1926a, 1140b 6) put it: "while making has an 
end other than itself, action cannot; for good action itself is its end". Tsoukas & Cummings (1997) 
explain: "there is an internal relationship between acting and the standards in terms of which acting is 
judged, which is not there when producing artifacts." (Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 666). For 
Aristotle, the central role is played by phrónêsis because, in human actions, the moral virtues and 
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practical knowledge go together: "it is impossible to be practically wise without being good" (1926a, 
1144a 18). Prudence (phrónêsis, practical wisdom) involves "knowing the right values and being able 
to put them into practice in concrete situations". (Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 666). As phrónêsis 
(practical wisdom, prudence) is both intellectual excellence and excellence of character, we cannot be 
intellectuality prudent (phronimoi) without being ethically good (Eikeland, 2008, p. 59). Phrónêsis 
cannot be acquired alone independently from other ethical virtues. Thus it is impossible to separate 
phrónêsis IURPRWKHUHWKLFDOYLUWXHV³we cannot be prudent without being good and we cannot be fully 
good without being prudent, taking the particulars of the situation into account´(LNHODQGS 
 
The focus of the particulars of the situation leads Tsoukas & Cummings (1997, p. 666) to ask the 
TXHVWLRQ ³Apart from being inherently value-laden, what is it about practical matters that requires 
human agents to have practical wisdom instead of merely scientific or craft knowledge"´5HIHUULQJWR
Aristotle, Nussbaum (1990, pp. 70-75) indicates three reasons: 1) practical matters change over time, 
and new problems call for new responses, 2) practical matters are inherently ambiguous, 3) 
1XVVEDXPSREVHUYHVWKDW³Aristotle suggests that the concrete ethical case may simply 
contain some ultimately particular and non-repeatable elements´.RQGUDWIXUWKHUVD\V 
 
"Praxis is the form of reasoning appropriate to social, political, or other interactive contexts in 
which the individual, drawing on experience to provide a grasp of the immediate situation, reasons 
how to act prudently and correctly in a given set of circumstances. Prudence supersedes 
effectiveness as the relevant virtue in such cases. Indeed, the prudent person may be called on to 
make choices among several potentially effective (or equally ineffective) courses of action." 
(Kondrat, 1992, p. 239). 
 
Another question immediately comes to mind concerning the kind of rationality mobilized by 
human agents in the course of action: Are they differentiating or reconciling formal abstract rationality 
(Kondrat, 1992; Toulmin, 2002) from substantive rationality (Kondrat, 1992), situated reasoning, 
espoused theory from theory-in-use (Argyris & Schön, 1974), with regards to uncertainty about the 
mode of action they adopt in specific situations? Warry offers an authoritative answer with regards to 
the mediating role of praxis and phrónêsis (both rooted on empeiría ± practical acquired experience), 
between past and future, between poeisis & tékhnê and Theôría & epistêmê, as well as between two 
kind of activities (aesthesis - perception) and (enérgeia ± perfecting actualization): 
 
"Gadamer's observation that understanding and interpretation must be integrated into the 
"moment" of application is critical (Gadamer, 1975, p. 273²274; see also Bernstein, 1983, p. 
159). Praxis, as a particular form of activity, can serve as a focal point through which the 
discursive testing of theory is grounded through decision making and experience (Habermas, 
1973, p. 20). Simply stated, praxis can serve as a common ground for those interested in basic 
and applied research by providing knowledge of the reality in which action, informed by theory 
takes place." (Warry, 1992, p. 156).  
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Thus, praxis and phrónêsis, in their mediating role serve as focal point through which dichotomies 
are integrated, and have been recognized as "emancipatory" (Habermas, 1971, p. 314; Gadamer, 
1975), and offering "a way of reflecting on disjuncture between the formal rationality and the 
substantive rationality" (Kondrat, 1992, p. 253). Project management authors such as Cicmil & 
Hodgson (quoting Balck, 1994, p. 2 in Cicmil & Hodgson, 2006, p. 13), Blomquist et al. (2010, p. 9) 
and Lalonde et al. (2012, p. 428) have acknowledged a similar view. As Eikeland (2008, p. 87) puts it, 
³Only in praxis, not in the study of external nature, the student and the studied, the knower and the 
known, coincide´ 
 
Reconciling Means and Ends, Facts and Values: Ethics is Politics 
 
An important aspect connected to the mediating role of praxis and Phrónêsis and to what Taylor 
(1993, p. 57) calls closing ³WKHSURQHWLFJDS´LVWKDWWKH$ULVWRWHOLDQWUDGLWLRQHQDEOHVXVWRVSHFLI\KRZ
WR³reconnect Means and Ends, Facts and Values´7VRXNDV	&XPPLQJVSDQGWRPRYH
EH\RQG³a dualistic way of thinking´10 (Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 668) about doing (practice) and 
thinking (theory, knowledge & competence development), factual statements and evaluative 
judgments.  
 
:HQHHGWRVWDUWIURP$ULVWRWOH¶VWHOHRORJLFDOYLHZRIWKHZRUOG)RUKLPKXPDQDJHQWVDQGQDWXUDO
things are defined for the sake of some functions or ends (purposes). From a factual statement such 
DV³+H6KHLH3URMHFW0DQDJHUPHHWV UHFXUUHQWO\DQGVXFFHVVIXOO\ WKHSURMHFWREMHFWLYHV´ZHFDQ
LQIHUWKHHYDOXDWLYHMXGJPHQW³s(he) LVDJRRG30´7HOHRORJLFDOO\FODVVLI\LQJsomeone as a PM is to 
think about the purposes, the ends, s(he) pursues with regards to the functions or roles s(he) fulfils or 
the way s(he) LV H[SHFWHG WR EHKDYH ³not conceiving [him/her] as ahistorical selves or abstract 
individuals´ 7VRXNDV 	 &XPPLQJV  S  7KXV FDOOLQJ D 30 ³JRRG´ LV WRPDNH D IDFWXDO
VWDWHPHQWDERXWZKDWDQDFNQRZOHGJHG³JRRG´30GRHVDQGQRWUHIHUULQJWRDOLVWRIDWWULEXWHVKHVKH
VKRXOGPHHW$FRQFHSWVXFKDV³JRRG´LVQRWDQDEVWUDFWHQWLW\RUFDWHJRU\LQDFlassification system, 
but is embedded in the activity, particular context and situation (Feyerabend, 1987, p. 113). Calling a 
SDUWLFXODU DFWLRQ ³JRRG´ PHDQV ZKDW D ³JRRG´ 30 ZRXOG LV H[SHFWHG GR LQ WKH VLWXDWLRQ DQG LV
therefore making a factual statement (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 59; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 670) 
reconciling facts and values. A direct implication is that the development of knowledge and 
competence should be made through practical acquired experience (empeiría) and perfecting 
actualization (energeia) and not just through perception (aísthêsis), abstract, distant and external 
REVHUYDWLRQ:HFDQVHHKHUHWKHDOLJQPHQWZLWKWKHZD\RIFRQFHSWXDOL]LQJ³XQLYHUVDOV´RU³JHQHUDO
WKHRU\´DV³6WDQGDUGV´(LNHODQGS 
 
                                                                                                                                
10  ͞In  contrast  to  dualism,  duality  implies  that  we  regard  an  entity  as  being  both  constitutive  and  constituting,  
ƐƵĐŚĂƐƚĂŬĞƐƉůĂĐĞŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨƌĞĐƵƌƐŝǀŝƚǇ;'ŝĚĚĞŶƐ͕ϭϵϳϵͿ͘͟  (Hernes  &  Bakken,  2003,  p.  1525).  
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'HYHORSLQJ³GR´ LH. practice AND knowledge and competence (theory), is done by entering the 
tradition of a community of practitioners11 (MacIntyre, 1985; Schön, 1987; Brown & Duguid, 1991) 
sharing common goals, i.e. ends, will, wish, or want and opinion (Eikeland, 2008, p. 87, 121) and way 
of achieving them (means, but with the underlying idea of doing (praxis) and doing well (eupraxia)12. 
%HLQJSDUWRI WKHFRPPXQLW\ LH3ROLVGRHVQ¶W LQYROYHEOLQGDFFHSWDQFHRIVWDQGDUGVFRQYHQWLRQV
norms (nomos ± laws) but at the same time the acceptance of historically developed laws and 
collective dialogues, debates, deliberations about them leading to possibly changing them (Solomon, 
1992; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 670; also see Castoriadis, 1991, p.104 for ancient Greek 
conception of politics))  
 
Tsoukas & Cummings (1997, p. 671) rightly enhances³«LQWKHVRFLDOGRPDLQLQJHQHUDODQGLQ
organizations in particular, uncertainty, ambiguity and politics must go together´7KXVWKURXJKSUD[LV
and phrónêsis³Ethics is politics inasmuch as the achievement of human happiness´6WUDQJS
1).   
 
Concluding comments 
 
7KLVSDSHURIIHUVILUVWDQGIRUHPRVWDFRQYHUVDWLRQDERXWWKHFRQFHSWRI³do´7KHEDFNJURXQGRI
the conversation is the AristotelLDQ LGHD WKDW ³EHLQJ´ JRRG LV LQWHUGHSHQGHQW RI ³GRLQJ´ JRRG WKXV
GLVFRXUVLQJDERXW WKH ³GR´ LVGLVFRXUVLQJDERXW WKH ³EH´)XUWKHUPRUHGLVFRXUVLQJDERXW WKH ³GR´ LV
GLVFRXUVLQJDERXWWKH³NQRZ´«The intention of this conversation is not to offer yet another evidence-
based management fad to the practitioners; neither it is our objective to identify a potential research 
gap in the literature for scholars. Rather, we want to open an assumption-challenging discussion with 
regards to main stream approaches, in what Long (2002, p.44) describes as WXUQLQJ³our eyes away 
from the blinding light of eternal certitude towards the refracted world of turbid finitude´/RQJS
44), and generating what Bernstein terms as ³Cartesian Anxiety´%HUQVWHLQS18), setting the 
scene for imaginative and innovative thinking (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2013) and suggesting a revisited 
FRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQRIWKH³do´ LQPDQDJHPHQW7KLVFRQYHUVDWLRQLVDOVRDERXWDUJXLQJWKDWQRUPDWLYH
truth, order, values and supporting asVXPSWLRQV³must always be critically engaged, for it does not lie 
                                                                                                                                
11  &ŽƌƌŝƐƚŽƚůĞ͕͞praxis  is  not  only  individual,  however.  Collective  praxis  is  possible  when  we  follow  common  
standards,  and  adjust  to  each  other  communicatively,  i.e.  through  establishing  mutual  and  common  
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐŽĨŚŽǁƚŚŝŶŐƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĚŽŶĞŝŶ͞ĐŽŶĐŽƌĚ͟;ŚŽŵſŶŽŝĂŝŶEϭϭϲϳĂϮϮ-­‐b16,  EE1241a16Ͷ34),  as  
e.g.  in  grammatical  regulations  of  language  use,  or  when  musicians  and  dancers  play  according  to  a  common  
score,  or  improvise,  tuning  in  on  each  other  knowing  the  basic  principles  of  the  music  and  the  dance͟;Eikeland,  
2008,  p.  87).  
12  The  distinction  between  ends  and  means  in  Aristotle  is  not  an  easy  topic,  and  is  linked  to  the  four  Aristotelian  
causes  (material,  formal,  efficient  (the  near  only  one  considered  by  moderns  and  post-­‐moderns),  and  final  (e.g.  
Mann  (2009).    For  an  in-­‐depth  discussion  see  e.g.  Eikeland,  2008,  p.194Ͷ196).    
Mann,  Scott.  (2009).  Aristotle,  Dialectic  and  Critical  Realism.  In  E.  Close,  G.  Couvalis,  G.  Frazis,  M.  Palaktsoglou,  
and  M.  Tsianikas  (eds.)  "Greek  Research  in  Australia:  Proceedings  of  the  Biennial  International  Conference  of  
Greek  Studies,  Flinders  University  June  2007",  Flinders  University  Department  of  Languages  -­‐  Modern  Greek:  
Adelaide,  63-­‐70.  
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in ultimates [or panaceas (Jackson, 2003, p. xiv)], but rather in the give and take between actually 
existing beings´/RQJS 
 
Looking for aQVZHULQJWKHTXHVWLRQ³ZKDWLVDJRRG30"´guides XVWRDGGUHVVWKH³WUXH´TXHVWLRQ
³ZKDWGRHVDJRRG30GR"´Visiting the concept of ³GR´ leads us to challenge the modern and post-
modern assumptions supporting both management theory and practice and to call for a ³UH´WXUQWRSUH-
modern Aristotelian gnoseology ± a liberation praxeology ± in order to bring a convincing answer in 
the pluralistic context of temporary-based organizing. This praxeological style of reasoning fully grasps 
the relational relationships between practice (acting, , FDQ QRZ VWDWH ³DFWLQJ ZHOO´ DQG IRU KXPDQ
happiness, in Aristotelian tradition) and knowledge and competence development (theory) ± all 
LQWHUGHSHQGHQWGLPHQVLRQVRI³GR´± i.e.: the mediating role of praxis and Phrónêsis in reconciling any 
dichotomous tKLQNLQJ LQWR WKH ³PRPHQW´ RI SUDFWLFDO DFTXLUHG H[SHULHQFH empeiría) and perfecting 
actualization (enérgeia) as ³GR´ ,6 both ways of knowing AND knowledge forms; The reconciliation 
means/ends and facts/values; and the necessary dialogue and deliberation aspects as well as the 
clear Ethics and Politics dimensions. Additionally, this style of reasoning fully acknowledges that what 
has been brought from the past (Aristotle) is still actual and help to overcome current exposed 
problems, antinomies, perplexities and contradictions; that theory is  embedded in practical contexts 
and experience; a dialogical and a dialectical mode of reasoning and action as encompassing duality 
for moving away any dichotomous thinking and dualism, and clarifying the way of conceptualizing 
³XQLYHUVDOV´RU³JHQHUDOWKHRU\´WKDWLVWKH³VWDQGDUGV´WUDGLWLRQ 
 
$FRQVHTXHQFHLVDQLQYLWDWLRQWRUHWKLQNWKHVRFDOOHG³SUDFWLFHWXUQ´DQG³SKURQHWLFUHYROXWLRQ´DV
well as clarifying the assumptions underlying the various kinds of action research. Eikeland & Nicolini 
(2011, p. 166) suggest to pay a central attention to research triggering critical dialogue and immanent 
critique (praxis 1 - praxis-theôría), starting from a position immersed in the action concerned and 
broadly theoretical, i.e. directed toward gaining insights, producing understanding or explanations. 
These authors advocate praxis research by contrast to the current action research keeping an 
³RXWVLGHU´ RU ³VSHFWDWRU´ SHUVSHFWLYH 'HYHORS VSHFLDOLVHG WHFKQLTXHV  DSSOLHG UHVearch (khrêsis, 
poíêsis-tékhnê); or Normal science (explanatory and  interpretive approaches) (theôrêsis)) or when 
immersed in the action, focusing on applied research, change and improvement (inform deliberation 
(praxis2 - phrónêsis)) rather than gaining insights, producing understanding or explanations. Another 
important direct consequence, resulting from $ULVWRWOH¶V WHOHRORJLFDO YLHZ RI WKH ZRUOG LV WKH
UHFRQFLOLDWLRQ EHWZHHQ IDFWXDO DQG YDOXH VWDWHPHQWV D ³JRRG´ 30 LV D IDFW DFNQRZOHGJLQJ ZKDW D
³JRRG´ 30GRHV)XUWKHUPRUH LQ DQ$ULVWRWHOLDQ SHUVSHFWLYH EHLQJ ³JRRG´PHDQV WR WDNHSDUW RI D
FRPPXQLW\ RI SUDFWLFH RU SUDFWLWLRQHUV LQ WKH ³ZD\-of-doing-WKLQJV´ DQG WKHUHIRUH WDNLQJ SDUW RI WKH
debates and deliberations about ends, means and laws having in mind the achievement of 
eudaimonia (human happiness) as ultimate goal. According to this perspective, ethics IS politics.  
 
Ultimately, we do hope reading this paper will provide an opportunity for Enérgeia and further 
dialogues and deliberations.  
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Table 1: Aristotelian ways of knowing (after Eikeland, 2007, p. 348; Eikeland, 2008, p. 526; Eikeland, 2012, p. 20) 
Basis Way of knowing  Associated 
rationality 
/ Knowledge forms 
English equivalent The known (what 
the knowledge 
concerns) in 
relation to the 
knower) 
³/RFDWLRQ´IRU
source of change 
known object 
(change principle / 
arkhë) 
End / aim (tèlos / 
skopos) for 
knowledge form 
Method / way / 
mean 
Aísthêsis 
(perception) 
theôrêsis = 
epistêmê2 
Deduction, 
demonstration, 
didactics 
Spectator 
speculation 
The known as 
external to knower: 
outer object qua 
phenomenon = 
appearance 
In external object / 
outside the knower 
(a) true statements 
(b) explanation and 
prediction 
Observation & 
³VSHFXODWLRQ´
application of / 
reduction to known 
concepts 
páthos ?? Being affected 
passively from the 
outside 
Within the knower Outside knower ³IRUPDWLRQ´DV
passive 
compliance-
habituation-
adjustment of 
emotions and 
passions 
³,PSUHVVLRQV´
(things and 
relationships are 
imposed from 
without so that the 
pressure is felt, an 
impression made, 
and one becomes 
impressed or 
depressed) 
Empeiría  
(practically 
acquired 
experience) 
khrêsis Tékhnê 
(calculation) 
Using instruments External to knower: 
external object qua 
something used as 
instrument 
Within the knower ³PDVWHU\´DVDFWLYH
adjustment to 
external object as 
instrument / means 
without changing it 
Practice / training / 
exercise 
poíêsis Making, 
manipulating 
materials 
External to knower: 
external object qua 
something 
manipulated, 
changes, created 
Within the knower Production or 
change in / of 
external object as 
material 
Manipulating / 
influencing / 
intervening 
praxis2 Phrónêsis 
(deliberation) 
Doing: virtuous 
performance, 
practical reasoning 
Within the knower; 
choice and 
performance of 
actions in a 
concrete situations 
Within the knower Choice of what 
leads to or contain 
ethico-political 
goods / ethically 
virtuous deeds 
Boúleusis ± 
deliberation, 
concrete situational 
judgments, 
deliberate choice 
(prohairesis) 
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Basis Way of knowing  Associated 
rationality 
/ Knowledge forms 
English equivalent The known (what 
the knowledge 
concerns) in 
relation to the 
knower) 
³/RFDWLRQ´IRU
source of change 
known object 
(change principle / 
arkhë) 
End / aim (tèlos / 
skopos) for 
knowledge form 
Method / way / 
mean 
Enérgeia 
(perfecting 
actualization) 
praxis1 Dialectics/dialogue. 
The way from 
novice to expert, 
from tacit to 
articulate 
Practice, training 
for competence 
development and 
insight (theôría) 
Within the knower: 
internal object / 
objective as praxis 
form: pragma and 
as graps / concept 
(eidos / morphê 
Within the knower Adaequatio ad rem 
/ pragmadequacy:  
(a) formation of 
virtue (arête) 
(b) truth as alêtheia 
/ anámnesis 
(uncover / 
recollection 
(c) understanding / 
insight 
(a) perfectioning 
(teleiôsis) through 
practice / training / 
exercise (áskêsis), 
(b) dialogics: 
articulation, bring 
things into 
language / into 
consciousness / 
distinguishing 
theôría = 
epistêmê1 
Dialogue, 
deduction, 
deliberation 
Insight 
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Table 2: Summary of the commonalities and distinctions between practice and phronetic turn (after 
Brown, 2012).  
 Practice turn Phronetic turn 
Commonalities There are features of practices which are not specific to the single case and thus 
can be theorized. 
Anti-positivism / constructivism (p. 442) 
5HMHFWLQJWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµQRUPDWLYH¶DQGµSRVLWLYH¶WKHRU\VRFHQWUDOWRD
particular kind of modern social science. (p. 445) 
 Focus on practices to bypass the relationship between agency (subjective 
knowledge) and structure (objective knowledge) (p. 442) 
Distinctions Social practices Good life (contemplation of the good) 
 Morality Ethics 
 Unconsciousness Consciousness  
Phrónêsis (faculty of reason shaped 
by experience) 
 Instinct: immersion in the habitus Instinct: hexis and product of an 
education in the virtues 
 Christian / Kantian ethical thought 
Simplicity is at root for virtue 
Greek ethical thought 
Virtue must be self-aware 
 
